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 IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
 FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
 
 NOS. 96-2092 and 96-2133 
 
IN RE: FORD MOTOR COMPANY, 
 
         Petitioner in No. 96-2092 
______________________ 
 
SUSAN I. KELLY, Administratrix and Personal 
Representative of the Estate of GERALD A. KELLY, 
deceased, on Behalf of Said Decedent’s  
Heirs-At-Law and Next-Of-Kin and on Her Own Behalf, 
 
          Respondent/Appellee 
 
 v. 
 
 FORD MOTOR COMPANY, 
 
 Appellant in No. 96-2133 
 
 _______________________________________ 
 
 Consolidated Petition For A Writ of Mandamus And 
 Appeal From the United States District Court For 
 The Eastern District of Pennsylvania 
 (E.D. PA Civ. No. 94-cv-02579) 
 _________________________________________ 
 
 Argued: January 28, 1997 
 
 Before: BECKER, ROTH, Circuit Judges, and 
 ORLOFSKY, District Judge.* 
 _______________ 
 
 (Filed April 9, 1997) 
 
 
 
JOSEPH V. PINTO, ESQUIRE (ARGUED) 
EVAN S. EISNER, ESQUIRE 
ROBERT TOLAND, II, ESQUIRE 
White and Williams 
1800 One Liberty Place 
1650 Market Street 
Philadelphia, PA 19103-7395 
 
 
                     
     
*
 Honorable Stephen M. Orlofsky, United States District 
Judge for the District of New Jersey, sitting by designation. 
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JOHN M. THOMAS, ESQUIRE 
Ford Motor Company 
Office of General Counsel 
1500 Parklane Towers West 
Suite 1500 
Dearborn, MI 48126 
 
Attorneys for Petitioner in No. 96-2092 
Appellant in No. 96-2133, Ford Motor Company 
 
 
ROBERT C. DANIELS, ESQUIRE (ARGUED) 
LARRY BENDESKY, ESQUIRE 
Daniels, Saltz, Mongeluzzi & Barrett, LTD. 
One Liberty Place, 34th Floor 
1650 Market Street 
Philadelphia, PA 19103-7395 
 
Attorneys for Respondent in No. 96-2092 
Appellee in No. 96-2133, Susan I. Kelly 
 
 
 __________________________ 
 
 OPINION OF THE COURT 
 ___________________________ 
 
BECKER, Circuit Judge. 
 By this appeal and companion petition for a writ of mandamus 
in one of the Bronco II product liability cases, the defendant 
Ford Motor Company, invoking the attorney-client privilege and/or 
the work product doctrine, challenges a district court order 
denying it protection from disclosure in discovery of certain 
documents requested by the plaintiff, Susan Kelly.  The question 
of the appropriate jurisdictional vehicle is precedentially 
important, for our ability to review such disputes is frequently 
called into question.  Therefore, as a threshold matter, we 
address the question whether the challenged order is appealable, 
see 28 U.S.C. § 1291, or reviewable by mandamus, see 28 U.S.C. § 
1651. 
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 We conclude that, because the district court’s order finally 
resolved an important issue separate from the merits that would 
be effectively unreviewable after final judgment, we have 
appellate jurisdiction under the collateral order doctrine.  In 
reaching this conclusion, we consider in some detail the anatomy 
of the “importance” facet of that doctrine, and we necessarily 
resolve certain tensions that exist in our recent jurisprudence 
in the area.  Because we have appellate jurisdiction, we do not 
review the challenged order by way of mandamus, even though our 
case law would require us to do so if we lacked appellate 
jurisdiction. 
 In contrast, the merits issues are quite straightforward.  
We have examined each of the documents in question in camera.  
They fall into two groups -- minutes of a meeting attended by 
top-level executives of Ford Motor Company regarding the Bronco 
II, and agendas for a discussion of the technical characteristics 
of the Bronco II.  We conclude that the minutes of the meeting 
reflect that the recorded communications were for the purpose of 
obtaining legal advice and hence are protected by the attorney-
client privilege.  With respect to the agendas and the 
handwritten notes referring to them, we determine that they were 
produced by an agent of an attorney in preparation for litigation 
and hence are protected by the work product doctrine; the other 
requirements for work product doctrine are not at issue.  We 
will, therefore, reverse the challenged portions of the district 
court’s order and remand with directions to issue an appropriate 
order protecting the documents from discovery. 
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 I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
 In the underlying lawsuit, Kelly claims that Ford 
defectively designed the Bronco II, a four-wheel drive utility 
vehicle with a relatively high center of gravity, by rendering it 
too susceptible to rollover.1  That defective design, Kelly 
submits, caused the death of her husband, Gerald Kelly, who was 
killed when the Bronco II he was driving rolled over.  Kelly 
sought to discover Ford documents related to the development, 
marketing, and safety of the Bronco II.  Ford responded, in part, 
by asserting that the attorney-client privilege and the work 
product doctrine shielded certain documents from discovery.  Ford 
sought from the district court a protective order that would have 
preserved the confidentiality of those documents.  By letter 
ruling of October 4, 1996, the district court held that, for the 
vast majority of documents for which Ford sought protection, the 
attorney-client privilege and/or the work product doctrine 
applied.  However, the court found that two sets of documents -- 
those at issue here -- were discoverable. 
 The first set of documents is the final draft of the minutes 
of a November 18, 1982 meeting of Ford’s Policy and Strategy 
Committee.  The Policy and Strategy Committee is made up of top 
executives at Ford, and acts as an advisory body to Ford’s chief 
executive officer.  At the meeting in question, Ford’s general 
counsel, Henry R. Nolte, Jr., briefed the committee about a 
report he had drafted regarding the Bronco II.  According to the 
                     
     
1Jurisdiction is based on diversity of citizenship.  See 28 
U.S.C. § 1332. 
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minutes, the committee engaged in an extensive discussion of the 
report and ultimately adopted the recommendations contained 
therein. 
 The second set of documents is composed of a series of 
agendas, one with handwritten notations, for a meeting in 1988, 
and one document pertaining to a 1989 meeting on which 
handwritten notes refer to the 1988 agendas.  By 1988, numerous 
lawsuits similar to that brought by Kelly were pending, alleging 
faulty design of the Bronco II.  As part of its defense strategy, 
Ford retained an outside technical consultant, Failure Analysis 
Associates (FAA), to assist in the defense of those lawsuits.  
FAA, in turn, relied in part on the help of in-house technical 
assistants to Ford.  Ernest Grush, one of these technical 
assistants, prepared the agendas for the 1988 meeting.  The 
meeting was called to explain the technical aspects of the Bronco 
II litigation defense strategy, and Ford attorneys were present. 
 Grush has declared that the handwritten notes on the document 
pertaining to the 1989 meeting are his, and that they refer to 
the 1988 meeting. 
 On October 4, 1996, the district court made a letter ruling 
denying protection for the documents here at issue.  Ford 
requested that the court reconsider its decision.  On November 
13, 1996, the court denied Ford’s request and, by a subsequent 
letter ruling of November 27, 1996, ordered the production of the 
documents by December 18, 1996.  The mandamus petition followed. 
 On December 18, the court again ordered the production of the 
documents.  Ford sought and we granted a motion for a stay of the 
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December 18 order.  Ford also filed a notice of appeal from the 
December 18 ruling.  We consolidated the appeal and the petition 
for a writ of mandamus and will, therefore, consider them 
together. 
II.  APPELLATE AND MANDAMUS JURISDICTION 
A.  Introduction; The First Prong of Cohen 
 The question of our jurisdiction is somewhat complicated.  A 
writ of mandamus is an extraordinary exercise of our 
jurisdiction; moreover, such a writ is not a substitute for 
appeal.  See Madden v. Myers, 102 F.3d 74, 77 (3d Cir. 1996).  
Because we will not issue a writ of mandamus if relief may be 
granted by way of an ordinary appeal, we must first determine 
whether Ford may appeal the district court’s ruling.  See 
Hahnemann Univ. Hosp. v. Edgar, 74 F.3d 456, 461 (3d Cir. 1996). 
 A fortiori, only if an appeal is unavailable will we determine 
whether a writ of mandamus will issue.  See PAS v. Travelers Ins. 
Co., 7 F.3d 349, 352 (3d Cir. 1993). 
 As a general rule, discovery orders are not final orders of 
the district court for purposes of obtaining appellate 
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  See Hahnemann Univ., 74 
F.2d at 461.  Therefore, discovery orders normally may not be 
appealed until after final judgment.  See id.  However, the 
collateral order doctrine, first enunciated by the Supreme Court 
in Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541 (1949), 
provides a narrow exception to the general rule permitting 
appellate review only of final orders.  An appeal of a nonfinal 
order will lie if (1) the order from which the appellant appeals 
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conclusively determines the disputed question; (2) the order 
resolves an important issue that is completely separate from the 
merits of the dispute; and (3) the order is effectively 
unreviewable on appeal from a final judgment.  See Rhone-Poulenc 
Rorer Inc. v. Home Indem. Co., 32 F.3d 851, 860 (3d Cir. 1994). 
 It is beyond cavil that the first element is satisfied here. 
 The district court’s December 18 order requiring the production 
of the disputed documents leaves no room for further 
consideration by the district court of the claim that the 
documents are protected. 
B.  The Second Prong of Cohen 
1.  Separability 
 The most familiar aspect of the second prong of Cohen is 
separability from the merits.  Kelly submits that a determination 
of the issues of privilege and work product will in fact 
implicate the merits of the underlying dispute.  We believe that 
it will not.  As we understand the merits of the underlying case, 
Kelly seeks to show what Ford knew about the alleged rollover 
propensity of the Bronco II, when it knew about this alleged 
propensity, and what it did about the alleged propensity.  The 
contents of the documents will certainly shed some light on these 
questions.  However, our resolution of the privilege and work 
product issues has nothing to do with them.  We are not concerned 
at this juncture about what Ford knew, when it gained this 
knowledge, or what it did about it.  Our inquiry largely involves 
questions of context -- e.g., who prepared the relevant 
documents, when were they prepared, and what was their purpose.  
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It involves content only insofar as we must ensure that the 
documents were prepared in certain contexts -- e.g., do the 
documents contain legal advice or do they disclose legal 
strategies?  We are not required, nor will we undertake, to 
resolve disputed questions of Ford’s knowledge of and Ford’s 
actions with respect to the alleged rollover propensity. 
 Kelly’s assertions to the contrary notwithstanding, neither 
Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 785 F.2d 1108 (3d Cir. 1986), 
nor State of New York v. United States Metals Refining Co., 771 
F.2d 796 (3d Cir. 1985) [hereinafter USMR], undermine this 
conclusion.  In both Cipollone and USMR, the defendants sought to 
protect materials gathered for or discovered during litigation 
from public dissemination.  Each defendant claimed that the 
sought-after material somehow distorted the actual facts and 
would, therefore, mislead the public about those facts.2  That 
claim, we held in both cases, would require us to examine the 
merits of the underlying dispute because we would need to make 
some determination of the actual facts presented by the case so 
as to compare them to the allegedly distorting or misleading 
material.  See Cipollone, 785 F.2d at 1117; USMR, 771 F.2d at 
799-800.  No such determination need be made here.  We can 
resolve the privilege and work product issues without delving 
into the disputed facts about Ford’s knowledge and actions. 
                     
     
2In Cipollone, the defendants claimed that the material at 
issue, though not trade secrets, would nonetheless cause 
embarrassment if released.  See Cipollone, 785 F.2d at 1121.  In 
USMR, the defendant sought to keep confidential a report that the 
plaintiffs had prepared detailing the pollution at the 
defendant’s plant.  See USMR, 771 F.2d at 798. 
  
 
 9 
2.  Importance 
 The parties have not suggested that the “importance” 
criterion is not satisfied.  However, because of our independent 
responsibility to examine our own jurisdiction sua sponte, and 
because the jurisprudence surrounding the importance criterion is 
somewhat murky, we will undertake a close analysis of this aspect 
of the collateral order doctrine.  Although “[m]ost courts have 
paid little attention to the ‘importance’ requirement,” John C. 
Nagel, Replacing the Crazy Quilt of Interlocutory Appeals 
Jurisprudence With Discretionary Review, 44 Duke L.J. 200, 207 
(1994), the Supreme Court has recently made patent that confusion 
over the criterion cannot lead to the conclusion that 
“‘importance’ is itself unimportant.”  Digital Equip. Corp. v. 
Desktop Direct, Inc.,     U.S.    , 114 S. Ct. 1992, 2001 
(1994).3  Rather, application of the Cohen collateral order 
                     
     
3In some formulations of the collateral order doctrine, the 
importance criterion is contained in the second prong of the 
test; in others, it is considered a factor in the third prong.  
See Digital Equip., 114 S. Ct. at 2001.  Although the language in 
Cohen itself implies that it is a separate element of the 
collateral order test, see Cohen, 337 U.S. at 546 (“This decision 
appears to fall in that small class which finally determine 
claims of right separable from, and collateral to, rights 
asserted in the action, too important to be denied review and too 
independent of the cause itself to require that appellate 
consideration be deferred until the whole case is adjudicated.”) 
(emphasis added), the most frequently cited Supreme Court 
statement of the test incorporates the importance criterion in 
the second prong, see Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U.S. 463, 
468 (1978) (“To come within the ‘small class’ of decisions 
excepted from the final-judgment rule by Cohen, the order must 
conclusively determine the disputed question, resolve an 
important issue completely separate from the merits of the 
action, and be effectively unreviewable on appeal from a final 
judgment.”) (emphasis added).  However, the Supreme Court 
recently suggested that the importance criterion is a necessary 
part of the third prong of the test.  See Digital Equip., 114 S. 
Ct. at 2001 (“[T]he third Cohen question . . . simply cannot be 
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doctrine is incomplete without an analysis of the importance of 
the issue sought to be reviewed. 
 Importance has a particular meaning in this context.  It 
does not only refer to general jurisprudential importance.  
Rather, the overarching principle governing “importance” is that, 
for the purposes of the Cohen test, an issue is important if the 
interests that would potentially go unprotected without immediate 
appellate review of that issue are significant relative to the 
efficiency interests sought to be advanced by adherence to the 
final judgment rule.4  In Johnson v. Jones,     U.S.    , 115 S. 
Ct. 2151 (1995), for example, the Supreme Court noted that any 
analysis of the Cohen test required an examination of the 
competing considerations that underlie finality, i.e., the costs 
                                                                  
answered without a judgment about the value of the interests that 
would be lost through rigorous application of the final judgment 
requirement.”).  Indeed, the ratio decidendi of this portion of 
the opinion, see infra, has third prong overtones.  Yet, in its 
most recent pronouncement on the collateral order doctrine, the 
Court included “importance” as a separate prong.  See Quackenbush 
v. Allstate Ins. Co.,     U.S.     , 116 S. Ct. 1712, 1718-19 
(1996).  As noted in the text, this court generally incorporates 
the importance criterion within the second prong.  No matter 
where it is placed, however, it is clear that it must be examined 
in order to satisfy the collateral order doctrine. 
     
4The Supreme Court has recently described the interests 
protected by the final judgment rule as follows: 
 
An interlocutory appeal can make it more difficult for trial 
judges to do their basic job -- supervising trial 
proceedings.  It can threaten those proceedings with delay, 
adding costs and diminishing coherence.  It also risks 
additional, and unnecessary, appellate court work either 
when it presents appellate courts with less developed 
records or when it brings them appeals that, had the trial 
simply proceeded, would have turned out to be unnecessary. 
 
Johnson v. Jones,     U.S.    , 115 S. Ct. 2151, 2154 (1995). 
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of piecemeal review on the one hand against the costs of delay on 
the other.  See id. at 2157.  The Court in Digital Equipment 
stated this in a slightly different manner, noting that the Cohen 
test requires a “judgment about the value of the interests that 
would be lost through rigorous application of a final judgment 
requirement,” Digital Equip., 114 S. Ct. at 2001, and that 
“‘important’ in Cohen’s sense [means] being weightier than the 
societal interests advanced by the ordinary operation of final 
judgment principles,” id. at 2002.  As a final example, Justice 
Scalia, in a concurrence, stated that a right is important for 
Cohen purposes only if it “overcome[s] the policies militating 
against interlocutory appeals.”  See Lauro Lines S.R.L. v. 
Chasser, 490 U.S. 495, 503 (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring). 
 Although one might assume that collateral finality would be 
determined by a bright-line rule, the importance determination 
under the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence is rather a function of a 
balancing process.  See, e.g., Behrens v. Pelletier,     U.S.    
 116 S. Ct. 834, 844 (1996) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (canvassing 
recent collateral order jurisprudence and noting that the 
importance analysis is a balancing of interests); Johnson, 115 S. 
Ct. at 2157 (stating that in determining appealability a court 
must look to the competing considerations that underlie questions 
of finality, namely “the inconvenience and costs of piecemeal 
review on the one hand and the danger of denying justice by delay 
on the other” (citations omitted)).  When engaging in this 
balancing, the Court has relied on a number of factors.  We 
mention here only a few contained in recent cases. 
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 In Quackenbush v. Allstate Ins. Co.,     U.S.    , 116 S. 
Ct. 1712 (1996), the Court allowed the immediate appeal of an 
abstention-based remand in part because the interests implicated 
by the appeal -- namely, the scope of federal jurisdiction and 
the desire for comity between the federal and the individual 
state judicial systems -- were sufficiently important.  See id. 
at 1719-20.  In Digital Equipment, the Court reasoned that a 
right contained in a private settlement agreement was not 
sufficiently important in part because that right did not 
“originat[e] in the Constitution or statutes.”  Digital Equip., 
114 S. Ct. at 2001.  In Puerto Rico Aqueduct and Sewer Auth. v. 
Metcalf & Eddy, Inc.,     U.S.    , 113 S. Ct. 684 (1993), the 
Court allowed the immediate appeal of a denial of Eleventh 
Amendment immunity in part because the right at issue “involves a 
claim to a fundamental constitutional protection.”  Id. at 688.  
And, in Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511 (1985), the Court 
allowed the immediate appeal of a claim to qualified immunity in 
part because such immunity was intended to reduce “‘the general 
costs of subjecting officials to the risks of trial -- 
distraction of officials from their governmental duties, 
inhibition of discretionary action, and deterrence of able people 
from public service.’”  Id. at 526 (quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 
457 U.S. 800, 816 (1982)). 
 In all of these cases, the Court has compared the apple of 
the desire to avoid piecemeal litigation to the orange of, for 
example, federalism.5  In terms of analytic purity, the results 
                     
     
5In addition to the collateral order doctrine cases cited 
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of such comparisons are, of course, debatable.  What is important 
for present purposes is that, in a number of the just-cited 
cases, the Court felt that, because of the imperative of 
preventing impairment of some institutionally significant status 
or relationship, the danger of denying justice by reason of delay 
in appellate adjudication outweighed the inefficiencies flowing 
from interlocutory appeal.  By the same calipers, we are 
convinced that in the present case the orange of the interests 
protected by the attorney-client privilege (which would be 
eviscerated by forced disclosure of privileged material) is 
sufficiently significant relative to the apple of the interests 
protected by the final judgment rule to satisfy the importance 
criterion of the second Cohen prong. 
 In the few cases in which our court has addressed the 
importance criterion, we have been less than pellucid in our 
                                                                  
elsewhere in this opinion, we list in this footnote a number of 
Supreme Court collateral order doctrine cases and the issues that 
were appealed therein as illustrative of the type of balancing 
that might be implicated.  The list is not exhaustive, nor does 
the Court explicitly engage in balancing in each of the cases.  
Those cases are:  Swint v. Chambers County Comm’n,     U.S.    , 
115 S. Ct. 1203 (1995) (municipal liability); Midland Asphalt 
Corp. v. United States, 489 U.S. 794 (1989) (public disclosure of 
grand jury matters); Van Cauwenberghe v. Biard, 486 U.S. 517 
(1988) (service of process and forum non conveniens); Gulfstream 
Aerospace Corp. v. Mayacamas Corp., 485 U.S. 271 (1988) 
(abstention-related stay); J.B. Stringfellow, Jr. v. Concerned 
Neighbors in Action, 480 U.S. 370 (1987) (intervention); 
Richardson-Merrell, Inc. v. Koller, 472 U.S. 424 (1985) 
(disqualification of counsel); Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp. v. 
Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1 (1983) (abstention-related 
stay); Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Risjord, 449 U.S. 368 
(1981) (disqualification of counsel); Helstoski v. Meanor, 442 
U.S. 500 (1979) (Speech and Debate Clause); United States v. 
MacDonald, 435 U.S. 850 (1978) (speedy trial); Abney v. United 
States, 431 U.S. 651 (1977) (double jeopardy). 
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discussion.  For example, we stated in Nemours Found. v. 
Manganaro Corp., New England, 878 F.2d 98 (3d Cir. 1989), that 
the issue on appeal must be important “in a jurisprudential 
sense,” see id. at 100, without explaining what is meant by 
“jurisprudential.”  And, in examining whether the relevant issue 
was important, we have from time to time (though not 
consistently) raised the question whether the issue presents “a 
serious and unsettled question.”  See, e.g., Federal Ins. Co. v. 
Richard I. Rubin & Co., 12 F.3d 1270, 1282 (3d Cir. 1993); Praxis 
Properties v. Colonial Sav. Bank, 947 F.2d 49, 56 (3d Cir. 1991). 
 “A serious and unsettled question” is a factor mentioned in 
Cohen, see Cohen, 337 U.S. at 547, but, for the most part, it has 
been ignored by the courts, see Robert J. Martineau, Defining 
Finality and Appealability by Court Rule: Right Problem, Wrong 
Solution, 54 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 717, 740 (1993). 
 We believe that presenting a serious and unsettled question 
is merely one means by which an issue may be important under 
Cohen.  It is clear that if a question presents a serious and 
unsettled question of law, resolution of that issue in an 
interlocutory appeal protects an interest that is significant 
relative to the interests protected by deferring review until 
final judgment.  Resolution of a serious and unsettled question 
has an impact beyond the parties before the court; it not only 
ensures the proper adjudication of the case before the court, but 
also may prevent erroneous adjudications in other cases and head 
off unnecessary appeals in those other cases.  These incidental 
effects promote some of the same goals the final judgment rule 
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promotes.  Therefore, though it is not a sine qua non, the 
presence of a serious and unsettled question is sufficient to 
satisfy the importance criterion of the Cohen test.6 
 Given our analysis of importance for Cohen purposes, we 
believe that the attorney-client privilege question before us 
also satisfies the importance criterion because the interests 
protected by the privilege are significant relative to the 
interests advanced by adherence to the final judgment rule.  It 
is often stated that the attorney-client privilege is at the 
heart of the adversary system; its purpose is to support that 
system by promoting loyalty and trust between an attorney and a 
client.  See Recent Case, 108 Harv. L. Rev. 775, 779 n.39 (1995). 
 The privilege is thereby intended to advance the “broad[] public 
interests in the observance of law and administration of 
                     
     
6Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 731 (1982), is a case in 
which the Supreme Court stated that an appeal must present a 
serious and unsettled question to fall within Cohen’s scope.  See 
id. at 742.  However, in so doing, the Court seemed to imply that 
a serious and unsettled question is merely one part of Cohen’s 
importance requirement.  In determining that the appeal before it 
did present a serious and unsettled question, the Court relied on 
the fact that it had never ruled on the question; that the Court 
of Appeals had done so did not settle the question for Cohen 
purposes.  See id. at 743.  This is curious reasoning; following 
it to its logical extreme, it would categorize as serious and 
unsettled any issue the Supreme Court has not decided.  At all 
events, later in Nixon the Court seems to limit this reasoning.  
It noted that the case before it pertained to sensitive issues 
related to the separation of powers between the executive and 
judicial branches of government.  See id.  The mention of these 
sensitive issues “might hint that the calculus of appeal includes 
the importance of the interests involved as well as the general 
importance of the question to other litigants.”  15A Charles Alan 
Wright, Arthur R. Miller & Richard L. Marcus, Federal Practice 
and Procedure § 3911.5, at 431 (2d ed. 1994).  As is evident in 
the text, our rendering of the importance prong is consistent 
with this discussion. 
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justice,” Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 389 (1981), 
by encouraging the full and frank communication between attorney 
and client necessary for vigorous and effective advocacy.  
Rightly or wrongly, our system assumes that the competition 
between vigorous and effective advocates, when pitted against 
each other in an adversary setting, will help to produce the best 
legal result in any given litigation.  In short, the attorney-
client privilege is one of the pillars that supports the edifice 
that is our adversary system.  As such, it is “deeply rooted in 
public policy.”  Digital Equip., 114 S. Ct. at 2004. 
 Privilege doctrine assumes that protecting that loyalty and 
trust and thereby advancing these broader interests can only be 
accomplished if privileged material is never disclosed, for only 
then will clients be encouraged to make full disclosure to their 
attorneys.  By fostering confidentiality, the attorney-client 
privilege, when vindicated, undermines some of the goals the 
final judgment rule seeks to realize.  Without the benefit of the 
material protected by the attorney-client privilege, trial courts 
face a more difficult fact-finding task.  Ferreting out the facts 
of a case becomes more costly, even if only marginally.  Often, 
the privilege will keep trial courts, juries, and appellate 
courts from considering certain facts, thereby forcing them to 
decide cases based on less than complete records.   
 In all, the privilege introduces certain inefficiencies into 
the judicial system, the same inefficiencies with which the final 
judgment rule is concerned.  See supra note 4.  Yet, every 
jurisdiction in this nation recognizes the attorney-client 
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privilege.  For the reasons set forth supra, the attorney-client 
privilege is thus important in the Cohen sense; the status or 
relationship, deeply embedded in our legal culture, is of 
sufficient importance that the danger of denying justice by delay 
in appellate adjudication (which would result in irremediable 
disclosure of privileged material) outweighs the inefficiencies 
introduced by immediate appeal.  Accordingly, prong two of Cohen 
is satisfied as to the attorney-client privilege question. 
 For similar reasons, the work product doctrine, at least at 
its “core,” satisfies the importance criterion.7  Like the 
attorney-client privilege, the work product doctrine seeks to 
promote the adversary system.  It does so “by protecting the 
confidentiality of papers prepared by or on behalf of attorneys 
in anticipation of litigation.”  Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. 
Republic of the Philippines, 951 F.2d 1414, 1428 (3d Cir. 1991). 
 Absent such protection, attorneys would “fear that their work 
product will be used against their clients,” id., and may become 
overly circumspect in preparing for litigation thereby reducing 
their effectiveness as advocates.  Such circumspection frustrates 
the assumptions on which the adversary system is based.  “Core” 
                     
     
7By the “core,” we mean the “mental impressions, 
conclusions, opinion, or legal theories of an attorney or other 
representative of a party concerning the litigation.”  Fed. R. 
Civ. P. 26(b)(3).  
Such core work product is generally afforded near absolute 
protection from discovery.  See 8 Charles Alan Wright, Arthur R. 
Miller & Richard L. Marcus, Federal Practice and Procedure § 2026 
(2d ed. 1994).  Because, as we discuss infra, the work product at 
issue here is at the core of the doctrine, we have no occasion to 
discuss whether work product generally is important for Cohen 
purposes. 
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work product thus reflects an institutionally important status or 
relationship in the law. 
 As with the attorney-client privilege, the work product 
doctrine rests on the non-disclosure of information.  Some of 
this information is potentially relevant to the disposition of 
the litigation; keeping it confidential might therefore impede 
the efficient functioning of the judicial system.  Yet, the work 
product doctrine, or a form of it, is widely recognized.  Thus, 
for the same reasons put forth in our treatment of the attorney-
client privilege, core work product, such as at issue here, meets 
the importance criterion and satisfies the second Cohen prong. 
C.  Effective Review:  The Third Prong of Cohen 
 The only remaining issue is the third element of the Cohen 
test, whether Ford can seek effective review of the privilege and 
work product issues on appeal after final judgment.  The Supreme 
Court has stated that review after final judgment is ineffective 
if the right sought to be protected would be, for all practical 
and legal purposes, destroyed if it were not vindicated prior to 
final judgment.  See, e.g., Lauro Lines, 109 S. Ct. at 1978.  In 
the context of mandamus jurisdiction, we have repeatedly held 
that appealing privilege and work product issues after final 
judgment is ineffective.  See Rhone-Poulenc, 32 F.3d at 861 
(discussing “privilege or other interests of confidentiality”); 
Haines v. Liggett Group, Inc., 975 F.2d 81, 89 (3d Cir. 1992) 
(discussing both attorney-client privilege and work product 
doctrine protections); Westinghouse, 951 F.2d at 1422 (same); 
Sporck v. Peil, 759 F.2d 312, 314-15 (3d Cir. 1985) (discussing 
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work product doctrine protections); Bogosian v. Gulf Oil Corp., 
738 F.2d 587, 591 (3d Cir. 1984) (same); see also Hahnemann 
Univ., 74 F.3d at 461 (discussing possible mandamus jurisdiction 
to review claim that documents were protected by, inter alia, a 
state law psychotherapist-patient privilege); Glenmede Trust Co. 
v. Thompson, 56 F.3d 476, 483-84 (3d Cir. 1995) (discussing 
mandamus jurisdiction over review of the terms of a protective 
order); Smith v. BIC Corp, 869 F.2d 194, 198-99 (3d Cir. 1989) 
(discussing the collateral order doctrine in the context of 
reviewing a claim that disputed documents contained trade secrets 
requiring protection); Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 822 F.2d 
335, 340 (3d Cir. 1987) (discussing mandamus jurisdiction over 
review of a protective order). 
 Undergirding those previous holdings is the notion that, 
once putatively protected material is disclosed, the very “right 
sought to be protected” has been destroyed.  Bogosian, 738 F.2d 
at 591.  That is so because, as we noted previously, underlying 
the attorney-client privilege is the policy of encouraging full 
and frank communications between an attorney and client, without 
the fear of disclosure, so as to aid in the administration of 
justice.  See, e.g., Westinghouse, 951 F.2d at 1423.  
Concomitantly, the work product doctrine is designed to promote 
the adversarial process by maintaining the confidentiality of 
documents prepared by or for attorneys in anticipation of 
litigation.  See, e.g., id. at 1428.  Appeal after final judgment 
cannot remedy the breach in confidentiality occasioned by 
erroneous disclosure of protected materials.  At best, on appeal 
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after final judgment, an appellate court could send the case back 
for re-trial without use of the protected materials.  At that 
point, however, the cat is already out of the bag. 
 As the Second Circuit aptly stated with respect to the 
attorney-client privilege, the limited assurance that the 
protected material will not be disclosed at trial “will not 
suffice to ensure free and full communication by clients who do 
not rate highly a privilege that is operative only at the time of 
trial.”  Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A. v. Turner & Newall, PLC, 964 
F.2d 159, 165 (2d Cir. 1992).  With respect to material otherwise 
protected by the work product doctrine, the party will be 
similarly irremediably disadvantaged by erroneous disclosure.  
“[A]ttorneys cannot unlearn what has been disclosed to them in 
discovery”; they are likely to use such material for evidentiary 
leads, strategy decisions, or the like.  Id.  More colorfully, 
there is no way to unscramble the egg scrambled by the 
disclosure; the baby has been thrown out with the bath water. 
 Our conclusions with respect to privilege and work product 
issues are buttressed by Supreme Court decisions allowing 
immediate appeal of official, qualified, and Eleventh Amendment 
immunities; of double jeopardy challenges; and of speech or 
debate challenges.  In each of those cases, the Court held that 
the rights asserted protected the claimant against trial, not 
just liability.8  Therefore, delaying review of orders 
                     
     
8See Puerto Rico Aqueduct and Sewer Auth. v. Metcalf & Eddy, 
Inc.,     U.S.    , 113 S. Ct. 684, 687-89 (1993) (examining 
Eleventh Amendment immunity); Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 
525-27 (1985) (examining qualified immunity); Nixon v. 
Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 731, 741-43 (1982) (examining absolute 
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implicating these asserted rights would preclude vindication of 
those very rights because delay would allow trial to proceed.  
The same is true as to privilege and work product issues.  Delay 
in such cases would allow the very disclosure against which those 
rules protect. 
 In most of our previous cases in which a party sought 
appellate review of an order requiring the disclosure of 
putatively protected documents, we did not allow review under the 
collateral order doctrine either because it was not raised at all 
by the parties or because the parties did not satisfy either 
element (1) or element (2) of the Cohen test.  In only two cases 
did we examine element (3) of the Cohen test in this context.  In 
Smith, we held that a party does not have an effective means of 
appealing after a final judgment an order requiring the 
disclosure of trade secrets.  As we stated there, “once trade 
secrets are made public, they can obviously never be ‘secrets’ 
again.”  Smith, 869 F.2d at 199.  Therefore, the court allowed an 
interlocutory appeal under the Cohen test and did not reach the 
question whether a writ of mandamus was appropriate.  See id. at 
199 n.3. 
 In the later Rhone-Poulenc case, the other case to examine 
element (3) of the Cohen test, the panel distinguished Smith by 
reasoning that any harm caused by the erroneous disclosure of 
material protected by the attorney-client privilege or the work 
                                                                  
immunity); Helstoski v. Meanor, 442 U.S. 500, 506-08 (1979) 
(examining the Speech and Debate Clause); Abney v. United States, 
431 U.S. 651, 660-662 (1977) (examining double jeopardy). 
  
 
 22 
product doctrine can be remedied.  According to that panel, an 
appellate court can, after final judgment, vacate the ruling of a 
trial court, remand the case for a new trial, and prohibit the 
use of the protected material or any material derived from the 
protected material at the new trial.  See Rhone-Poulenc, 32 F.3d 
at 860.  We believe, however, that this part of the holding in 
Rhone-Poulenc is inconsistent with both Smith and the mandamus 
line of cases that hold that there can be no effective review 
after final judgment of an order requiring the disclosure of 
putatively protected material.  See supra.  In fact, Rhone-
Poulenc seems to say as much when it held that mandamus 
jurisdiction existed because there is “no other adequate means to 
attain relief from the district court’s order that compels the 
disclosure of privileged information and work product,” citing 
the mandamus line of cases for support.  Id. at 861. 
 Because they precede Rhone-Poulenc, we are bound by the 
holdings in Smith and the mandamus line of cases.  See O. Hommel 
Co. v. Ferro Corp., 659 F.2d 340, 354 (3d Cir. 1981) (“[A] panel 
of this court cannot overrule a prior panel precedent.”).  
Therefore, we hold that there is no effective means of reviewing 
after a final judgment an order requiring the production of 
putatively protected material.  Accordingly, the strictures of 
the collateral order doctrine have been met in this case, and we 
have jurisdiction over the appeal.  Our review of the district 
court order will be plenary. 
D.  Mandamus 
 Because we have appellate jurisdiction, there is no need to 
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examine whether we have original, mandamus jurisdiction.  
However, we also believe that if we did not have appellate 
jurisdiction, we would have mandamus jurisdiction to review the 
district court’s order.  See, e.g., Rhone-Poulenc, 32 F.3d at 861 
(exercising mandamus jurisdiction over review of privilege and 
work product issues); Haines, 975 F.2d at 88-91 (exercising 
mandamus jurisdiction over review of work product issues); 
Westinghouse, 951 F.2d at 1422 (exercising mandamus jurisdiction 
over privilege and work product issues); Sporck, 759 F.2d at 314-
15 (exercising mandamus jurisdiction over work product issues); 
Bogosian, 738 F.2d at 591 (same). 
 The practical difference between appellate jurisdiction and 
mandamus jurisdiction is the standard of review.  Our standard of 
review under appellate jurisdiction is plenary; our standard of 
review under mandamus jurisdiction is for a clear error of law.  
See, e.g., Westinghouse, 951 F.2d at 1423.  Accordingly, mandamus 
jurisdiction affords an appellate court less opportunity to 
correct district court error in the case before it and less 
opportunity to provide guidance for future cases.  Moreover, 
comity between the district and appellate courts is best served 
by resort to mandamus only in limited circumstances.  Review 
under appellate jurisdiction is therefore preferable to review 
under mandamus jurisdiction.  In light of this preference, the 
wisdom of our holding that an appeal will lie in this case is 
confirmed. 
III.  MINUTES OF THE 1982 MEETING; ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE 
 After an in camera review of the relevant documents, we 
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conclude that the final minutes of the 1982 meeting are protected 
by the attorney-client privilege.  Primarily at issue is whether 
the communications memorialized by the minutes were made for the 
purpose of obtaining legal advice.  Federal Rule of Evidence 501 
states: 
[I]n civil actions and proceedings, with respect to an element of 
a claim or defense as to which State law supplies the rule 
of decision, the privilege of a witness, person, government, 
State, or political subdivision thereof shall be determined 
in accordance with State law. 
 
Fed. R. Evid. 501.  In this civil, diversity case in which state 
law governs, Rule 501 provides that state law will govern the 
issue of privilege.  See Rhone-Poulenc, 32 F.3d at 861-62. 
 It is not clear whether the law of Pennsylvania, the forum 
state, or the law of Michigan, the state in which the 
communications occurred, will supply the rule as to privilege.  
We need not reach this potentially thorny issue, however, because 
the law as to attorney-client privilege in Pennsylvania does not 
differ in any significant way from that in Michigan.  The 
elements of the attorney-client privilege are well-known and are 
not, in any material respect, disputed here.  We need not, 
therefore, dwell on them, except to note their basic contours in 
Pennsylvania and Michigan. 
 In Pennsylvania, the attorney-client privilege in civil 
matters has been codified.  The relevant statutory provision 
reads: 
In a civil matter counsel shall not be competent or permitted to 
testify to confidential communications made to him by his 
client, nor shall the client be compelled to disclose the 
same, unless in either case this privilege is waived upon 
the trial of the client. 
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42 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 5928 (West 1982).  The communications 
must be for the purpose of obtaining legal advice.  See Leonard 
Packel & Anne Bowen Poulin, Pennsylvania Evidence § 501.1(c), at 
306 & n.22 (1987 & Supp. 1995).  A corporation may claim the 
privilege for communications between its counsel and its 
employees who have authority to act on its behalf.  See Maleski 
v. Corporate Life Ins. Co., 641 A.2d 1, 3 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1994); 
Packel & Poulin, supra, § 501.1(b). 
 In Michigan, the standard is stated in similar terms.  The 
attorney-client privilege “attaches to the confidential 
communications made by a client to his attorney acting as a legal 
adviser and made for the purpose of obtaining legal advice on 
some right or obligation.”  Kubiak v. Hurr, 372 N.W. 2d 341, 345 
(Mich. Ct. App. 1985).  Case law in Michigan also recognizes the 
right of a corporation to claim the privilege to protect 
communications between certain of its employees and its counsel. 
 See Hubka v. Pennfield Township, 494 N.W. 2d 800, 802 (Mich. Ct. 
App. 1992) (citing Mead Data Central, Inc. v. U.S. Dep’t of the 
Air Force, 566 F.2d 242, 253 n.24 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (interpreting 
the federal Freedom of Information Act)), rev’d on other grounds, 
504 N.W. 2d 183 (Mich. 1993). 
 Our brief review of Pennsylvania and Michigan law as to the 
attorney-client privilege reveals that the two states agree in 
the respect most relevant to our case: for a communication to be 
privileged, it must have been made for the purpose of securing 
legal advice.  See, e.g., Rhone-Poulenc, 32 F.3d at 862 (setting 
out the traditional elements of the attorney-client privilege and 
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including the requirement that the communication be made for the 
purpose of securing legal advice); Restatement of the Law 
Governing Lawyers §§ 118, 122 (Proposed Final Draft No. 1 1996) 
(same).9  We now turn to determining whether the communications 
contained in the relevant document satisfy this standard.10 
 Our review of the final minutes, the draft minutes, the 
report Nolte summarized at the meeting, and relevant affidavits, 
leads us to conclude that the communications in the meeting were 
made for the purpose of securing legal advice.  Ford clearly had 
concerns about the Bronco II; this is not surprising given that 
the product was in the early stages of its development.  Nolte 
examined the legal implications of some of those concerns and 
proposed a particular course of action, contained in his report 
to the Policy and Strategy Committee, to address them.  The 
Policy and Strategy Committee meeting itself was called in part 
to discuss Nolte’s proposal.  The discussion at the meeting, 
then, was intended to secure Nolte’s legal advice. 
 The district court initially ruled that the minutes 
                     
     
9It should be noted that the law makes no distinction 
between communications made by a client and those made by an 
attorney, provided the communications are for the purpose of 
securing legal advice.  See Restatement of the Law Governing 
Lawyers §§ 118, 120 (Proposed Final Draft No. 1 1996).  In other 
words, the entire discussion between a client and an attorney 
undertaken to secure legal advice is privileged, no matter 
whether the client or the attorney is speaking. 
     
10The parties do not dispute that Nolte was Ford’s attorney 
at all relevant times and that the members of the Policy and 
Strategy Committee had the authority to act on behalf of Ford. 
Although Kelly does argue that Ford did not intend for the 
communications to be kept confidential, we find that argument to 
be without merit.  Ford’s actions with respect to these documents 
clearly evinced such an intent. 
  
 
 27 
“disclose only factual material, contain no legal discussion, 
were not created in anticipation of litigation . . ., and contain 
no communication to counsel which was intended to be kept 
confidential.”  The court later stated that the minutes were 
“business records” that memorialized “essentially business and 
safety decisions.”  We disagree with the district court’s 
conclusions as to the nature of the documents.  The documents do 
not contain merely factual material nor do they detail mere 
business decisions.  Certainly, the ultimate decision reached by 
the Policy and Strategy Committee could be characterized as a 
business decision, but the Committee reached that decision only 
after examining the legal implications of doing so.  Even if the 
decision was driven, as the district court seemed to assume, 
principally by profit and loss, economics, marketing, public 
relations, or the like, it was also infused with legal concerns, 
and was reached only after securing legal advice.  At all events, 
disclosure of the documents would reveal that legal advice. 
 We thus hold that the minutes of the 1982 meeting are 
protected from discovery by the attorney-client privilege.11 
                     
     
11Discussion in a published opinion of our conclusions based 
upon an in camera review is necessarily limited.  We cannot 
reveal too much about the contents of the documents for fear of 
undermining the very purposes of such review.  Our methodology is 
to reveal only as much of the content as is necessary to produce 
a reasoned opinion that can itself be reviewed.  If further 
review is necessary, the en banc court or the Supreme Court can 
examine for itself the relevant documents in conjunction with our 
opinion.  We recognize that the advocacy of the attorneys 
representing the party seeking allegedly protected documents is 
hampered by their inability to review those same documents.  That 
disadvantage is one we must accept; otherwise, the very purpose 
of the privilege will be destroyed. 
 The observations made in this footnote apply equally to our 
discussion of the documents allegedly protected by the work 
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IV.  THE AGENDAS; THE WORK PRODUCT DOCTRINE 
 Similarly, our in camera review leads us to conclude that 
the agendas for the 1988 meeting and the handwritten notes on the 
document pertaining to the 1989 meeting are protected from 
discovery by the work product doctrine.12  Codified in the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the work product doctrine 
allows a party to discover material prepared in anticipation of 
litigation or for trial only upon a showing that the requesting 
party has a substantial need for the material and cannot obtain 
the material or its equivalent elsewhere without incurring a 
substantial hardship.  See Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(3).  The rule as 
codified provides that “[i]n ordering discovery of such materials 
when the required showing has been made, the court shall protect 
against disclosure of the mental impressions, conclusions, 
opinions, or legal theories of an attorney or other 
representative of a party concerning the litigation.”  Id. 
                                                                  
product doctrine. 
     
12Ford claims that the agendas are also protected by the 
attorney-client privilege.  We disagree.  There is no indication 
in the record that the relevant 1988 meeting at which the agendas 
were discussed involved the kind of communications the privilege 
protects.  Ford’s assertions to the contrary and the affidavits 
supporting them are nothing more than conclusory. 
 Ford also claims that the handwritten notes on a document 
pertaining to the 1989 meeting are protected by the attorney-
client privilege because they refer to legal advice provided at 
the 1988 meeting.  (Ford does not claim that the meeting itself 
or the typewritten portions of the document are protected.)  
Because we do not see the 1988 meeting as involving confidential 
communications made to secure legal advice, we do not believe 
these handwritten notes are privileged.  However, these notes do 
refer to the agendas from the 1988 meetings and to the studies on 
which the agendas were based.  We will, therefore, consider these 
notes as being equivalent to the 1988 agendas.  As we discuss in 
the text, the 1988 agendas are protected by the work product 
doctrine.  These notes, then, are similarly protected. 
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 It is also clear that the work product doctrine protects 
materials prepared by an agent of the attorney, provided that 
material was prepared in anticipation of litigation.  See 8 
Charles Alan Wright, Arthur R. Miller & Richard L. Marcus, 
Federal Practice and Procedure § 2024, at 359 (2d ed. 1994).  
These elements, like those of the attorney-client privilege, are 
well-known and are not, in any relevant respect, disputed here.  
We need not, therefore, elaborate on them.  Rather, the dispute 
over the agendas turns on whether they were prepared in 
anticipation of litigation, since the other elements necessary 
for work product protection are met.13 
 It is clear from our review of the record that the agendas 
disclose material prepared as part of Ford’s legal strategy for 
defending the type of case Kelly brought here.  The agendas 
outline the results of studies conducted as to the safety of the 
Bronco II and, in so doing, highlight important aspects of those 
studies.  Those studies were found by the district court to be 
protected by the work product doctrine because they would be used 
in defending anticipated lawsuits.  Ford persuasively contends 
that experts acting on behalf of Kelly and working backwards from 
the agendas could determine the methodology of the studies.14  
Ford’s attorneys and their agents called for the studies, and 
                     
     
13The record makes it clear that the agendas were prepared 
by an agent of Ford’s attorneys.  In addition, Kelly has not made 
the requisite showing of substantial need to overcome the work 
product doctrine protections. 
     
14Although Kelly does not dispute this contention, we 
suspect that it might have been difficult for Kelly to do so 
given that she has not seen the agendas. 
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Ford credibly demonstrates that if Kelly learns the methodology 
of the studies, then she has effectively learned of the issues of 
most concern to Ford’s litigation defense team.  Moreover, the 
agendas themselves were for meetings at which the experts would, 
inter alia, explain the technical aspects of Ford’s legal defense 
strategy by referring to those studies.  We are satisfied, in 
view of the foregoing, that these agendas, core work product, 
were prepared in anticipation of litigation. 
 The handwritten notations that appear on the document 
pertaining to the 1989 meeting are similarly protected by the 
work product doctrine.  Although not as extensive as the agendas 
themselves, the notations refer to the agendas.  In some places, 
the notations employ the same language as that which appears on 
the agendas.  In others, the notations, when read in connection 
with the typewritten portions of the document to which they 
refer, provide clear hints as to what is contained in the 
agendas.  In all instances, the notations, like the agendas 
themselves, would allow Kelly to determine the methodology of the 
studies. 
 It is true, of course, that the agendas and the handwritten 
notations (and, for that matter, the studies themselves) were not 
prepared with this particular litigation in mind.  However, that 
is of no import given the facts of this case.  At the time the 
relevant material was prepared, Ford was a defendant in numerous 
lawsuits alleging defects in the Bronco II, and this material was 
prepared in anticipation of those lawsuits.  The literal language 
of Rule 26(b)(3) requires that the material be prepared in 
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anticipation of some litigation, not necessarily in anticipation 
of the particular litigation in which it is being sought.  See In 
re Grand Jury Proceeding, 604 F.2d 798, 803 (3d Cir. 1979) 
(holding that the work product doctrine will protect material 
prepared in anticipation of civil proceedings from discovery in a 
grand jury proceeding); see also 8 Wright, Miller & Marcus, 
supra, § 2024, at 350-51 (collecting cases and concluding that 
most courts consider the work product doctrine to protect 
material prepared in anticipation of previous litigation).15 
 The district court ruled that nothing in the record 
indicated “that the meetings [for which the agendas were 
prepared] involved discussion or agenda items about any 
particular litigation or that the meetings were in anticipation 
of litigation nor do the documents disclose any legal advice or 
opinions, or that legal advice was given.”  Instead, the court 
ruled that the “meetings were in the nature of product safety 
meetings, not legal department meetings.”  As our discussion 
makes clear, we disagree with the district court in one important 
respect:  we are convinced that the agendas were prepared in 
anticipation of litigation.  That the agendas do not necessarily 
include legal advice is irrelevant provided, as we note above, 
they were prepared in anticipation of litigation.  Moreover, it 
                     
     
15As in In re Grand Jury Proceedings, there is “an identity 
of subject matter” between the litigation for which the material 
was prepared and the present litigation.  See In re Grand Jury 
Proceedings, 604 F.2d at 803.  We therefore need not decide 
whether the work product doctrine protects material 
prepared for any previous litigation, or only previous litigation 
related to the present litigation. 
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is of no import that the meetings for which the agendas were 
prepared were not legal department meetings.  In this case, the 
context in which the agendas were discussed does not change the 
reasons for their preparation. 
 In sum, we conclude that the work product doctrine, as 
codified in Rule 26(b)(3), protects the agendas from discovery. 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
 In view of the foregoing, the order of the district court 
dated December 18, 1996 will be reversed in part and the case 
remanded to the district court with directions to deny discovery 
of the documents stamped with Bates numbers 6680-82, 13882, 
14236, and 21831 in their entirety, and to deny discovery of the 
handwritten notations on the document stamped with Bates number 
14241. 
 ___________________________________ 
 
TO THE CLERK: 
 Please file the foregoing opinion. 
 
     BY THE COURT: 
 
     ______________________ 
      Circuit Judge 
